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**TITLE**

Measuring Moral Inclusion:  
A Validation of the  
Inclusion/Exclusion of Other  
Groups (IEG) Scale

**Research paper**


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## **Abstract**

Moral exclusion is defined as excluding other individuals or groups from one's own moral community; i.e. viewing others as lying beyond the boundary within which moral values and rules of justice and fairness apply. On the contrary, the process of moral inclusion involves the extension of social justice to several social groups. Thus, both moral inclusion and exclusion are a pivotal dimension in the study of social inequalities. Although the concept of moral inclusion/exclusion has a history of more than twenty years, research still lacks accurate instruments for measuring it. In this article, a first version of a scale that measures both moral inclusion and exclusion was constructed and validated. The good reliability and correlation indexes found across the samples suggest that IEG is a good measure for tapping into moral exclusion/inclusion symptoms.

## **Keywords**

Moral inclusion | Moral exclusion | Validation | Scale | Scope of justice

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## 1. Introduction

Many scholars have pointed out (Deutsch, 1985; Opatow, 1990a; Staub, 1989) that our moral values, beliefs and norms apply to people we include within our scope of justice, namely the moral community. A moral community is the group to which the rules of justice apply and it may be either narrow – referring to only a few people such as ingroup members – or wide, as far as referring to the whole world community. As Opatow (1990b) pointed out, the psychology of justice – at least until 1990 – has mainly examined the forms that justice takes but not whether justice is applied equally to different social groups. This assumption of an equal inclusion of all the social groups within the sphere of justice is called into question by the moral exclusion processes. Moral exclusion is defined as excluding other individuals or groups from one's own moral community (Opatow, 1990b). In other words, viewing others as lying beyond the boundary within which moral values and rules of justice and fairness apply. On the contrary, the process of moral inclusion involves the extension of social justice to groups that had formerly been excluded from the scope of justice.

Processes of moral exclusion are ubiquitous in everyday life and in intergroup relations. Despite their ubiquity in everyday life, they are not easy to detect due to the rationalizations and justifications that support them (Opatow, 1990b). These justifications are institutionalized, often hidden and accepted as they are inescapable (Fine, 1990). For this reason, Opatow (1990b) suggested focusing on characteristic symptoms of moral exclusion. The author identified more than two dozen symptoms (see Opatow, 1990b), such as *derogation* – i.e. disparaging and denigrating others by regarding them as lower life forms or inferior beings – and *fear of contamination* – i.e. perceiving contact with others as posing a threat to one's well-being. All these symptoms are relevant for detecting processes of moral exclusion. Opatow (1990a) highlighted the need for empirical research. She affirmed that "experimental work, largely lacking, could provide precise and reliable measures of moral inclusion and exclusion, identify factors that modify moral boundaries" (Opatow, 1990b, p. 14). Although twenty years have passed, social sciences still lack a reliable measure of moral inclusion and exclusion. Given the relevance of the moral inclusion/exclusion concept for intergroup relations studies, the aim of this study is to go in the direction of filling this gap.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that although not many studies have focussed on the methodological operationalization of the concept of moral exclusion/inclusion – at least as theorized by Opatow – moral exclusion processes have been studied with reference to different theoretical approaches. For instance, in a discursive psychology perspective Tileaga (2006) analyzed the processes of moral exclusion focusing on the intricacies of discourse and on the issue that moral discourses are constructed and used in and through social interaction. Within the framework of moral development, Killen (2007) has instead studied the processes of *intergroup*

*exclusion*, i.e. the decision to exclude others on the basis of their group membership. In our opinion, both these approaches are specifically focussed on some of the symptoms of moral exclusion identified by Opatow and confirm the incidence and occurrence of moral exclusion processes in the realm of everyday life.

### 1.1 *Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Groups*

The theoretical definition of moral exclusion – and its counterpart moral inclusion – refers to the individual attitudes related to the enforcement of moral values and rules of justice in the context of intergroup interactions. Opatow (1990a) has identified a long list of symptoms that allow researchers to detect moral exclusion and – overturning them – moral inclusion processes. We can therefore presume that the opposing notions of moral exclusion and moral inclusion may be identified by a measurable individual-difference which taps into the inclusion/exclusion of other groups (IEG). Such a measure addresses the way people consider social groups as being eligible for an equal vs. unequal treatment in respect to moral values and justice, and whether those social groups have to be considered or not as belonging to the same community and civilization. Thus, we consider IEG to be a general attitudinal orientation towards social groups, reflecting whether one generally considers different groups to be worthy of respect and to be part of the same inclusive category (moral inclusion) or whether one generally does not consider those groups on the same level, as regards civilization, respect, moral values, justice (moral exclusion).

Even if the concept of moral inclusion/exclusion has over twenty years, to our knowledge only two measures that explicitly tap moral inclusion/exclusion have been validated: Opatow's (1993) scope of justice scale and Passini's (2005) moral exclusion scale. The first one is meant to measure attitudes concerning one's beliefs about another's entitlement to justice. The scale has some limitations because, in our opinion, it does not tap precisely into the symptoms of moral exclusion identified by Opatow herself (1990b). Moreover, the scale was always used in reference to a single group. As we will discuss next, this is a limitation to the detection of moral exclusion/inclusion attitudes.

Instead, Passini's (2005) moral exclusion scale includes 16 items that tap into four correlated dimensions derived from some of the symptoms of moral exclusion (e.g. derogation, dehumanization): *labeling, feeling of being threatened, destructive ideologies and explicit attack*. Participants have to answer to the items after having indicated a group that they consider to be threatening. This scale has some limitations too. First, the issue that participants had to respond with a group that they consider to be threatening in mind could lead to strong moral exclusion feelings but may less detect those attitudes of moral exclusion that are ubiquitous in everyday life. Similarly, some of the items are more appropriate to detect severe forms of moral exclusion. However, in the context of everyday life it is more relevant to already detect mild forms of moral exclusion (Opatow, 1990b). Third, also the Passini's scale is designed to address a single group.

This represents a methodological mismatch with the theoretical conceptualization. Indeed, referring only to one group translates inclusion process to a dichotomy. However, as Opatow pointed out (1990b), moral inclusion and moral exclusion do not refer to the inclusion/exclusion of a single group, but define a more general attitude toward social groups and categories. In this sense, moral inclusion may be conceived in terms of breadth or extension of the moral community (Morselli & Passini, 2010). A broader moral community will be described by a more inclusive attitude, while a narrow community is connoted by high exclusion. For this reason, the operationalization of the concept should consider attitudes towards more than one group and draw a picture of different levels of inclusion on a continuum from “no groups” to “all the groups.”

### 1.2 IEG scale

Starting from Passini’s scale, some items were chosen and rephrased in order to be more focused on mild forms of moral exclusion/inclusion and to have bipolar items: on the one hand, the item of moral exclusion, on the other, the same item tapping into the moral inclusion concept. In particular, items referred to two symptoms of moral exclusion/inclusion were devised: *derogation* and *fear of contamination*. These two symptoms were chosen among the others because they may be generalized to all different types of moral exclusion processes from the more to the less severe. Moreover, they identify moral exclusion/inclusion processes that happen in the context of intergroup relations. Participants are asked to respond referring to some national or supranational groups other than their own, in order to capture attitudes towards outgroup members. Although the aim was to get a general attitude score, the IEG refers to specific groups of daily life, instead of addressing to exclusion/inclusion in general terms as commonly happens for other concepts such as authoritarianism, etc. The lack of reference to reality may indeed mask the moral exclusion symptoms that are harder to recognize in ourselves (Opatow, 1990c). In our opinion, central to the moral inclusion concept is the extension of the individual inclusion/exclusion attitudes, rather than the inclusion/exclusion of one single group. That is, the “breadth” of the moral community within which outgroup members are perceived as being entitled of the moral principles. On the other side, moral inclusion/exclusion processes are considered in a broad sense and not as context-specific. The social context is considered relevant to identify groups that are not totally unknown to respondents, but the aim is to tap into a context-independent psychological process.

The IEG scale is composed by four oppositions. Each time the respondents are asked to choose where their position relative to specific outgroups – i.e.. Albanians, French, Moroccans – lies, on a scale between two statements (the first one identifies the moral exclusion of the group, the second identifies the group’s moral inclusion). The items are bipolar, rated on a 7-point scale between +3 (moral exclusion) on the left and +3 (moral inclusion) on the right. The four oppositions are: (1) “Values held by this group represent a threat to our well-being” *versus* “Values held by this group represent an opportunity for our well-being;” (2) “Members of this group deserve no respect” *versus* “Members of this group deserve our utmost respect;” (3) “It is necessary to avoid any kind of contact with members of this group” *versus* “It is necessary for all of us to engage in

establishing constructive contacts with this group's members;" (4) "I think that members of this group of people are uncivilized" *versus* "I think that members of this group of people are civilians" (See Appendix). Because the aim of the scale is to tap into the width of the moral community, the choice of the targeted outgroups should be theoretically relevant and possibly set the boundaries of the moral community at different distances. That is, researchers should choose to ask the battery of questions for outgroups that are likely to be target of bias and outgroups perceived as less different from the respondent's one.

## **2. Aims and Hypotheses**

The aim of the present research is to validate the Inclusion/Exclusion of other Groups (IEG) scale. Specifically, our goals are: (1) to develop an internally reliable measure of moral inclusion/exclusion of other groups; (2) to test the relationship between the IEG scale and other attitudinal variables to which IEG should be strongly related (predictive validity); and (3) to test the non-redundancy between the IEG scale and other attitude predictors (discriminant validity).

### *2.1 Predictive Validity*

*Prejudice.* Prejudice is classically defined as "an aversive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group" (Allport, 1954, p. 7). As prejudice reflects hostile attitudes towards outgroups – and thus reflect a tendency of excluding some other groups – and as it was theoretically expected from Opatow's (1990b) theory, we expect it to be negatively correlated with IEG.

*Authoritarian submission.* Since authoritarianism often supports the derogation of other groups, we hypothesize that moral inclusion is negatively linked to a "blind" acceptance of the dictates and prescriptions of authorities. Hence, we expect to find a negative correlation between authoritarian submission and IEG.

*Post-materialist values.* A lengthy tradition of psychological and sociological research (see Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005) has shown that values connected to freedom and equality – defined by Inglehart (1977) as post-materialist – are related to high tolerance towards diversity. Thus, we expect post-materialist values to be positively linked to IEG.

*Support for Democracy.* Given the correlation between post-materialist values and democratic attitudes (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), we also expected that support for democracy would be linked to intergroup tolerance and, consequently, to lower exclusion of outgroups from moral boundaries.

*Future time orientation.* Future time perspective is defined as "the totality of the individual's views of his psychological future [...] existing at a given time" (Lewin, 1951, p. 75). Some studies (e.g. Wolf, et al., 2009) have shown that when people focus on the future they are more likely to be

willing to reduce intergroup conflict. Thus, we expect future-oriented people to be more likely to be inclusive in respect to other groups.

*Political affiliation and importance attached to politics.* Since outgroup tolerance is more common among supporters of left-wing political parties than supporters of right-wing political parties (see Barnea & Schwartz, 1998), we expect that the more people declare they are politically Right-wing inclined, the more they are likely to exclude some groups from their moral community. On the other hand, some research has shown that social ties are reinforced among people with a high level of political commitment (Tarrow, 1996).

## 2.2 *Discriminant Validity*

The second set of hypotheses states that IEG should have predictive value in addition to close concepts. The “marginal utility” of IEG is verified by analyzing whether correlations between IEG and other attitudinal variables are significant after controlling for them. The concepts that we considered close to IEG are Opatow’s scope of justice (see above), social distance, inclusion of the other in the self (IOS), identification and social dominance orientation (SDO).

Social distance is defined as the extent to which people wish to avoid increasing levels of intimate contact between themselves and members of different social groups (Bogardus, 1933). IOS is referred to the perception of proximity and closeness between the self and the others (Aron & Smollan, 1992). Identification refers to the assumption that behaviors, cognitions and feelings will be determined by different levels of cognitive categorization of the Self (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The more people identifies with an inclusive category (e.g. as citizens of the world), the less they have prejudice and stereotypes. SDO is defined as “a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal versus hierarchical” (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742). This ideology of superiority of one group over the others supports group and legitimizes the discrimination of outgroups.

## **3. Method**

### 3.1 *Participants*

A total of 972 subjects (51.8 % men, 48.2 % women) in six samples filled out different questionnaires including the IEG scale. Across the six samples used, participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 83 years. Demographic information about each sample is shown in Table 1.

### 3.2 *Samples and procedures*

Data of the six samples were examined to test the predictive and discriminant validity and reliability of the IEG scale. Subjects in Samples 1, 4 and 6 were recruited from amongst the general population. People were handed an anonymous questionnaire that they returned filled in. Subjects in Samples 2, 3 and 5 were contacted via the Internet and responded to an online

questionnaire by accessing a Website. In this case, a link to an online questionnaire was provided to potential participants in an e-mail sent by various means (e.g. mailing lists, newsgroups). The subjects in Samples 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 were Italians while the subjects in Sample 3 were Americans.

### 3.3 Measures

*Inclusion/exclusion of other groups (IEG).* The IEG scale presented in the Introduction was used in all the samples. Samples 1 and 6 completed the questionnaire with reference to the following groups: Albanians, French, Moroccans, Romanians and U.S. citizens. In samples 2, 3 and 4 the items were referred to the following groups: French, Germans, Iranians and Romanians. Finally, in sample 5 participants completed the questionnaire with reference to the supranational groups: European, Asian, African and South American.

*Subtle and blatant prejudice.* The subtle–blatant prejudice scale (on a 7-point scale from 1 = 'strongly disagree' to 7 = 'strongly agree') by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) was used with specific reference to Romanian immigrants. Some sample items of the scale are: "It is just a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If Romanians would only try harder they could be as well off as the Italians" (subtle), "Romanians have jobs that the Italians should have." (blatant). This scale was used in Sample 1, 5 and 6. Cronbach's alphas were: .85 (Sample 1), .77 (Sample 5), .85 (Sample 6) for subtle subscale; .83 (Sample 1), .84 (Sample 5), .83 (Sample 6) for blatant subscale.

*Authoritarian submission.* This construct was measured by a 4-item scale based on Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer, 1996). The questionnaire was constructed and validated by Passini (2008). The 4 items were "our country will be great if we do what the authorities tell us to do", "it's important for children to learn to obey authorities", "people who criticize the authorities create pointless doubts in people's minds" and "people must, always and in any case, have greater freedom to protest against the government" (reverse-coded item). People responded to each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This scale was used in Sample 2, 3, 4 and 5. The scale had good reliability on all the samples: .84 (Sample 2), .73. (Sample 3), .75 (Sample 4), .71 (Sample 5).

*Post-materialism.* The 4-item post-materialism scale by Inglehart and Abramson (1999) was used for measuring post-materialistic values. The respondents were asked two rank-type questions to choose the highest and next-to-the-highest priority indicator out of a choice from among four values (two materialist and two post-materialist). The materialist values were: keeping order in the nation; fighting rising prices. The post-materialist values were: giving people a greater say in government decisions; protecting freedom of speech. A post-materialism index was constructed scoring 1 = two materialist answers, 2 = materialist (rank 1) and post-materialist (rank 2) answer, 3 = post-materialist (rank 1) and materialist (rank 2) answer, and 4 = two post-materialist answers. This scale was used in Sample 2, 3 and 4.

*Future-time orientation.* Future orientation was measured by the one-dimensional 10-item version of the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994). Participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 7 (extremely characteristic) the extent to which each statement of the CFC described them. An example of item is "I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my day to day behaviour". This scale was only used in Sample 5 ( $\alpha = .81$ ).

*Support for democracy.* U.S. participants answered to the classical scale by Klingemann (1999) on support for democracy. The questions sought to evaluate various types of political system as a way of governing a country on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (not good at all) to 4 (very good): (1) having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; (2) having army rule; (3) having a democratic political system. Support for democracy was defined as disagreeing with the first two items and agreeing with the third. This scale was only used in Sample 3 ( $\alpha = .84$ ).

*Support for democratic principles.* On the basis of the scale included in the World Values Survey (2005), participants were asked to respond to 5 statements capturing different characteristics of a democracy (from 1 = "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" to 7 = "an essential characteristic of democracy"). An example is "People choose their leaders in free elections." This scale was used in Sample 2 ( $\alpha = .84$ ) and 4 ( $\alpha = .81$ ).

*Scope of justice.* Opatow's (1993) scope of justice scale measures attitudes concerning one's beliefs about another's entitlement to justice. It consists of three items (on a 7-point scale from 1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree"), in this research referred to immigrants: (1) belief that considerations of fairness apply to immigrants, (2) willingness to make personal sacrifices to help or foster immigrants' well-being, and (3) willingness to allocate a share of community resources to immigrants. This scale was only used in Sample 1 ( $\alpha = .67$ ).

*Social distance.* On the basis of the Bogardus (1933) social distance scale, we asked participants of Sample 1 to respond to 6 items for 5 national groups (Albanians, French, Moroccans, Rumanians, U.S. citizens). "Do you accept to have a member of this group as (1) fellow citizen?; (2) next-door neighbour?; (3) co-worker?; (4) close friend?; (5) in-law?; (6) spouse?" All the items were measured on a dichotomous scale, 0 = No, 1 = Yes. Cronbach reliabilities were between  $\alpha = .80$  (U.S. citizens) and  $\alpha = .89$  (Rumanians). A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with oblimin rotation was conducted on social distance to the different national groups. Two factors were extracted (Eigenvalue distribution: 3.10, 2.41, .29, .15, .10). The rotated factor solution clearly separated some groups that are considered more similar to the ingroup (U.S. citizens and French,

closeness with more similar groups), and other groups that instead are considered probably as less similar to the ingroup (Albanians, Moroccans and Romanians, closeness with less similar groups).

*Inclusion of the other in the self (IOS).* The IOS is a reliable measure of perception of proximity between the self and the others (Aron & Smollan, 1992). In this research, the IOS scale was adapted to intergroup relations. Participants in Sample 5 were asked to indicate which from among four pictures better described their relationship with the others. In the pictures two circles were depicted, the first of which contained the word "Me" and the second contained a different regional group of people each time – i.e. European, Asian, African and South American. Cronbach's  $\alpha$  of the overall scale was .83.

*Identification.* Participants indicated their agreement on a 4-point scale to two items: (1) I consider myself to be a world citizen; (2) I consider myself to be an Italian (American in Sample 3). This scale was used in Sample 1 and 6.

*Social dominance orientation (SDO).* SDO was measured with a 10-item version of the SDO6 scale (Pratto et al., 1994). All items were measured on a 7-point scale, anchored at "strongly agree" and "strongly disagree." A sample item of the scale is: "Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups." This scale was used in Sample 1 ( $\alpha = .84$ ), 5 ( $\alpha = .72$ ) and 6 ( $\alpha = .80$ ).

*Demographics and politics.* In all the samples, participants indicated their age, gender, political affiliation (on a 10-point scale, from 1 = "extreme left" to 10 = "extreme right") and importance attached to politics (on a 7-point scale, from 1 = "not at all" to 7 = "very much").

## **4. Results**

First, the internal reliability of the IEG scale is presented. Then, in order to test the predictive and the discriminant validities, correlations and partial correlations are presented.

### *4.1 Reliability of the IEG Scale*

As reported in Table 1, the IEG scale showed good internal reliability across all samples, from  $\alpha = .89$  (Sample 5) to  $\alpha = .96$  (Sample 1). In all the samples, the Cronbach's  $\alpha$  did not increase with the elimination of any item. All the item-total correlations for the IEG items were over .40 across all samples.

**Table 1.** Description of Samples, Coefficient Alphas, Means, Standard Deviation and Correlation with Sex and Age by Sample for Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Group Scale.

Measure	Sample					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>n</i>	124	169	104	180	217	178
Age <i>M</i> (range)	37.8 (18-75)	41.56 (19-75)	46.19 (18-70)	41.64 (19-75)	42.30 (21-80)	31.19 (18-83)
% men	54.0	54.4	51.0	54.1	56.9	40.4
IEG scale						
<i>n</i> items	20	16	16	16	16	20
$\alpha$	.96	.92	.91	.92	.89	.95
Inter-item <i>r</i> (range)	.61-.85	.52-.77	.50-.75	.42-.78	.46-.84	.40-.86
First two eigenvalues	11.88, 2.35	6.67, 1.68	5.75, 1.90	6.70, 1.70	7.19, 1.53	10.01, 2.49
<i>M</i>	1.49	1.68	1.13	1.53	-1.24	0.57
<i>SD</i>	1.18	1.13	0.95	1.14	0.55	1.20
$r_{sex}$	.12	-.01	-.03	.00	.09	-.06
$r_{age}$	-.09	.10	-.10	.16*	.00	.07

Notes: IEG = Inclusion/exclusion of other group. Sex was coded as 0 = men and 1 = women. IEG extended from -3 to 3.  
 \*  $p < .05$ .

Within each sample, a principal axis factoring of the items was computed. The scree test revealed a clear break between the first and second eigenvalue in every sample (see Table 1). Hence, only one factor was retained from the analysis. Correlations between IEG scale and sex and age are negligible – except in Sample 4 in which IEG has a small positive correlation with age [ $r(180) = .16, p < .05$ ].

#### 4.2 Predictive Validity

In line with the hypotheses, IEG scores were negatively correlated with both subtle and blatant prejudice, authoritarian submission and political affiliation, and positively correlated with post-materialism, CFC, support for democracy, support for democratic principles and importance attached to politics (see Table 2).

**Table 2.** Correlations of All the Variables with Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Group Scale.

Measure	Sample					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Predictive Validity</i>						
Blatant prejudice	-.64***				-.53***	-.46***
Subtle prejudice	-.49***				-.47***	-.49***
Authoritarian submission		-.25***	-.28**	-.22**	-.31***	
Post-materialism		.34***	.24**	.33***		
CFC					.28***	
Support for democracy			.21*			
Support for democratic principles		.24***		.25**		
Importance given to politics	.41***	.36***	.13	.35***	.13	.18*
Political affiliation	-.36***	-.35***	-.33***	-.33***	-.44***	-.39***
<i>Discriminant Validity</i>						
Scope of justice	.49***					
CLOS SIM	.42***					
CLOS NOTSIM	.66***					
IOS					.39***	
ID world	.32***					.30***
ID participant's nation	.12					.13
SDO	-.53***				-.52***	-.50***

Notes: CFC = Consideration of future consequences. CLOS SIM = Closeness with groups more similar. CLOS NOTSIM = Closeness with groups less similar. IOS = Inclusion of the other in the self. ID = Identification. SDO = Social dominance orientation

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

### 4.3 Discriminant Validity

The second part of Table 2 reports correlations with discriminant variables. The IEG scale was correlated with all the variables that measure close concepts: Opatow's scope of justice, closeness with groups more similar and less similar to the ingroup, IOS, identification with humanity (while not correlated with identification with the participants' national group) and SDO.

To test whether IEG had a predictive power over and above those contiguous concepts, the correlations between IEG and the predictive variables were computed after partialling out from time to time each discriminant variable and also partialling them all in one single step. Table 3 shows that sign, magnitudes and significance of the partial correlations do not differ substantially from the zero-order correlations for most of the discriminant variables partialled out. A drop of magnitude of the correlation with the blatant and subtle prejudice can be observed when either the Bogardus measure for closeness to not similar groups or the SDO are partialled out. However, the

correlations are still moderately high ( $r > .30$ ) and significant at the level of  $p < .001$ . Correlations are still significant – except CFC – also when all the discriminant variables were partialled in one step. Political affiliation was the most sensitive variable to the partialization of SDO (except Sample 1), given the well-known high correlation between SDO and political conservatism (Pratto et al., 1994). Thus, according to the discriminant validity hypothesis, we can assume that the IEG scale taps uniquely into the variables considered for this research.

**Table 3.** Partial Correlations with Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Group Scale.

	Measures					
	Blatant prej.	Subtle prej.	AUT	CFC	Imp. pol.	Pol. aff.
Partial correlations removing						
Sample 1						
Scope of justice	-.58***	-.42***			.34***	-.27**
CLOS SIM	-.58***	-.45***			.37***	-.34***
CLOS NOTSIM	-.42***	-.30**			.36***	-.19
SC world	-.63***	-.46***			.42***	-.46***
SC Italy	-.64***	-.50***			.40***	-.36***
SDO	-.55***	-.41***			.34***	-.32***
All the above variables	-.34***	-.21*			.32***	-.23*
Sample 5						
IOS	-.46***	-.42***	-.27***	.21**	.07	-.37***
SDO	-.31***	-.28***	-.06	.16*	-.02	-.20**
All the above variables	-.28***	-.26***	-.16*	.12	-.05	.17*
Sample 6						
ID world	-.40***	-.43***			.13	-.32***
ID participant's nation	-.47***	-.50***			.18*	-.39***
SDO	-.33***	-.40***			.16*	-.24*
All the above variables	-.55***	-.38***			.38***	-.42***

*Notes:* Prej. = Prejudice. AUT = Authoritarian submission. CFC = Consideration of future consequences. Imp. pol. = Importance given to politics. Pol. aff. = Political affiliation. CLOS SIM = Closeness with groups more similar. CLOS NOTSIM = Closeness with groups less similar. ID = Identification. SDO = Social dominance orientation. IOS = Inclusion of the other in the self.

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

## 5. Discussion

The aim of this article was to construct and validate a scale for measuring moral inclusion/exclusion processes to fill the gap of a reliable measure noted by Opatow (1990b). Using two of the symptoms of moral exclusion/inclusion indicated by Opatow (1990b) – i.e. derogation and fear of contamination – we defined inclusion/exclusion of the other group (IEG) as a measure of beliefs on social groups being eligible of equal vs. unequal treatments in respect to moral values and justice. Thus, IEG was analyzed as a general attitudinal orientation to consider social groups worthy of respect and part of the same inclusive category (moral inclusion) or not to consider

some groups at the same level, with regard to civilization, respect, moral values and justice (moral exclusion).

The results of the six samples tested the validity of the scale. The IEG scale showed a very good reliability and high item-total correlations in all the research samples. Moreover, the reliability data of the scale were very similar across samples, despite a reference to different sets of social groups. This provides evidence that inclusion/exclusion processes are a general way of considering intergroup reality and moral community and are not necessarily elicited by a specific context or by specific groups. Indeed, even if the context is relevant to refer to the reality in which people live and to give some examples which respondents refer to, we aimed to detect attitudes of inclusion and exclusion from moral community independently from a specific context. In this sense, we operationalized moral inclusion as a continuous variable from "all outgroups included" to "no outgroup included." Thus, the scale would discriminate on the one extreme people who consider moral values and justice to be equally applied to all the social groups without distinction. On the opposite, the scale discriminates respondents who do not consider any other group – apart their own ingroup – as deserving the same rules of justice and moral values.

We think that the methodology used by the IEG represents a good way of detecting the moral exclusion and inclusion symptoms, as the correlations with predictive and discriminant variables confirmed. Indeed, correlations on the six samples confirmed the predictive validity of the IEG scale. As hypothesized, IEG was negatively correlated with prejudice, with authoritarian submission, and with political affiliation. On the other side, it was positively correlated with post-materialism, CFC, support for democracy and importance attributed to politics. Moreover, the data also supported the discriminant validity of the IEG, i.e. a non-redundancy of the scale with other similar attitude predictors. Even if the IEG was correlated to all those variables, it had a predictive value in addition to their effects.

The most delicate aspect of the IEG is the choice of the groups to be listed. Indeed the aim of the scale is to hypothetically draw the boundaries of the personal moral community, *vis-à-vis* certain categories of outgroups. In the present study, national and supranational (Sample 5) outgroups were chosen to compare this scale with commonly used measures of prejudice and social distance. The choice of the groups was theoretically driven and included at least one group close to the targeted respondents (e.g. French, Europeans) and one perceived as potentially distant and target of bias in the reference context (i.e. Romanians, Albanians). As results have shown, correlations between the IEG and the other measures were not influenced by the type of groups, suggesting that the IEG taps into a general psychological process. In this validation, we focused on national outgroups, but different types of groups could also be used (i.e. different social groups). We recommend that groups should be logically combined and referred to the same type of groups.

However, future research may address the question of the moral community in reference to different types of groups at the same time.

Another aspect of the IEG to which researchers should pay attention is the choice of the number of groups to list. We tested a five groups and a four groups versions, showing only a slight increment in Cronbach's alpha for the five-group version. That is not surprising given that the alpha is sensitive to the number of items in the scale. Pratto and colleagues (2012) tested a single-group version of the IEG in a study on a new SDO scale, finding analogous results to those reported here. Although the choice of the number of groups may depend on a number of factors, either theoretical or practical (for each group the 4 items of the scale need to be repeated, exponentially increasing the questionnaire length), we suggest that at least one potentially distant and one potentially close group should be chosen in reference to the real context in which the scale is administered. Recently we tested a version of the IEG in which the respondents themselves had to declare in a preliminary step from two to four ethno-national groups other than their own living in their area. Preliminary results showed a strong reliability of the scale, independently from the number of groups declared by the respondents. However, further investigation is needed in this direction.

The results presented in this article are promising, although the strength of a construct may be detected only through many applications and through the analysis of the predictive value of the scale on different concepts. Hence, despite the high correlation indexes between IEG and the scales considered in this research, the collection of more complex and stratified data is necessary to improve the validation of the scale. However, the good reliability and correlation indexes found across the samples suggest that IEG is a good measure for tapping into moral exclusion/inclusion symptoms. Such symptoms are pervasive in everyday life and may legitimate the systematic discrimination and prejudice of certain minorities, such as the recent political success of xenophobic Right-wing parties and movements in Europe has shown. As a recent analysis of the visual images concerning immigrants which appeared in propaganda posters used by the Italian Northern League political party has shown (Volpato et al., 2010), consensus to xenophobic policies is often supported by strategies of moral exclusion of some groups. In this sense, the IEG may be a powerful tool for social scientists to advance their research into those aspects that may offset such phenomena. The identification of the strategies and symptoms of moral exclusion might indeed constitute a basis for promoting moral inclusion processes and social tolerance.

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**Appendix.** The Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Groups (IEG) Scale.

Values held by this group represent a threat to our well-being		Values held by this group represent an opportunity for our well-being
<b>Group 1</b>	+3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3	
<b>Group 2</b>	+3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3	
<b>Group n</b>	+3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3	
Members of this group deserve  no respect		Members of this group deserve our utmost respect
<b>Group 1</b>	+3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3	
<b>Group 2</b>	+3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3	
<b>Group n</b>	+3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3	

It is necessary to avoid any kind of contact with members of this group



It is necessary for all of us to engage in establishing constructive contacts with this group's members

<b>Group 1</b>	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3	
<b>Group 2</b>	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3	
<b>Group n</b>	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3	

I think that members of this group of people are uncivilized.



I think that members of this group of people are civilians

<b>Group 1</b>	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3	
<b>Group 2</b>	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3	
<b>Group n</b>	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3	